diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 6cd6daefaaedeb160a6f1ac1d616de7871b38965..dcff82205477cb935e8e2e2a156829eb182dead4 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -12,11 +12,14 @@ Description:
 		then closing the file.  The new policy takes effect after
 		the file ima/policy is closed.
 
+		IMA appraisal, if configured, uses these file measurements
+		for local measurement appraisal.
+
 		rule format: action [condition ...]
 
-		action: measure | dont_measure
+		action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise
 		condition:= base | lsm
-			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=]]
+			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=] [fowner]]
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
 				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 
@@ -24,36 +27,50 @@ Description:
 			mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
 			uid:= decimal value
+			fowner:=decimal value
 		lsm:  	are LSM specific
 
 		default policy:
 			# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
 			# SYSFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
 			# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
 			# TMPFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
+			# RAMFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
 			# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
 
 			measure func=BPRM_CHECK
 			measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
 			measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+			appraise fowner=0
 
 		The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
 		all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
-		open for read by root in do_filp_open.
+		open for read by root in do_filp_open.  The default appraisal
+		policy appraises all files owned by root.
 
 		Examples of LSM specific definitions:
 
 		SELinux:
 			# SELINUX_MAGIC
-			dont_measure fsmagic=0xF97CFF8C
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
 
 			dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
+			dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t
 			dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
+			dont_appraise obj_type=auditd_log_t
 			measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
 			measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
 
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index fa09e64d9877dd96fbdad5116ace8437ca1f1fe6..949dddcfd17784724c6c6ce59afd8cd697e998de 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1055,6 +1055,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			Format: { "off" | "enforce" | "fix" }
 			default: "enforce"
 
+	ima_appraise_tcb [IMA]
+			The builtin appraise policy appraises all files
+			owned by uid=0.
+
 	ima_audit=	[IMA]
 			Format: { "0" | "1" }
 			0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 4865f61f9044c68cfaf9da5f6cd7b0901bc72f8d..681cb6e7225760a92b7987ebc9e30909718eb77b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -36,7 +36,10 @@ __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);
  */
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
 {
-	return 0;
+	if (!ima_appraise)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE);
 }
 
 static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3e22e17da295ce7d4d4e8bc15d135d6f996df28a..0d6d60b4ba6f8bb4dbba57f70e1385db6f7924ad 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #define IMA_MASK 	0x0002
 #define IMA_FSMAGIC	0x0004
 #define IMA_UID		0x0008
+#define IMA_FOWNER	0x0010
 
 #define UNKNOWN			0
 #define MEASURE			1	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
 	LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
 };
 
-struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
+struct ima_rule_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	int action;
 	unsigned int flags;
@@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
 	int mask;
 	unsigned long fsmagic;
 	uid_t uid;
+	uid_t fowner;
 	struct {
 		void *rule;	/* LSM file metadata specific */
 		int type;	/* audit type */
@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
 
 /*
  * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
- * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
+ * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
  */
 
 /*
@@ -63,7 +65,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
  * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
  * and running executables.
  */
-static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@@ -81,19 +83,41 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
 };
 
-static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
-static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
-static struct list_head *ima_measure;
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = 0,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
+static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
+static struct list_head *ima_rules;
 
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
 
 static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
-static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str)
+static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
 {
 	ima_use_tcb = 1;
 	return 1;
 }
-__setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
+__setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
+
+static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
+static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+	ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
 
 /**
  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
@@ -104,7 +128,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
  *
  * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
  */
-static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
+static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 			    struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
@@ -120,6 +144,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
 		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != cred->uid)
 		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && rule->fowner != inode->i_uid)
+		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid, sid;
@@ -172,10 +198,10 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		     int flags)
 {
-	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
 
-	list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
 
 		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
 			continue;
@@ -196,22 +222,31 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 /**
  * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
  *
- * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
- * the new measure_policy_rules.
+ * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
+ * the new ima_policy_rules.
  */
 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
-	int i, entries;
+	int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
 
 	/* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
-	if (ima_use_tcb)
-		entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
-	else
-		entries = 0;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
-		list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
-	ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
+	measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
+	appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
+			 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
+	
+	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
+		if (i < measure_entries)
+			list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
+				      &ima_default_rules);
+		else {
+			int j = i - measure_entries;
+
+			list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list,
+				      &ima_default_rules);
+		}
+	}
+
+	ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -228,8 +263,8 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
 	int result = 1;
 	int audit_info = 0;
 
-	if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) {
-		ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules;
+	if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
+		ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
 		cause = "complete";
 		result = 0;
 	}
@@ -240,14 +275,17 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
 enum {
 	Opt_err = -1,
 	Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
+	Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
 	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
 	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
-	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid
+	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_measure, "measure"},
 	{Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
+	{Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
+	{Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
 	{Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
 	{Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
 	{Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
@@ -258,10 +296,11 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
 	{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
 	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
+	{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
-static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
+static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
 			     char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
 {
 	int result;
@@ -285,7 +324,7 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
 	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
 }
 
-static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
+static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	char *p;
@@ -294,6 +333,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
 
 	entry->uid = -1;
+	entry->fowner = -1;
 	entry->action = UNKNOWN;
 	while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
 		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
@@ -322,11 +362,27 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 
 			entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
 			break;
+		case Opt_appraise:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = APPRAISE;
+			break;
+		case Opt_dont_appraise:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
+			break;
 		case Opt_func:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
 
 			if (entry->func)
-				result  = -EINVAL;
+				result = -EINVAL;
 
 			if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
@@ -391,6 +447,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 					entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
 			}
 			break;
+		case Opt_fowner:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->fowner != -1) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+			if (!result) {
+				entry->fowner = (uid_t) lnum;
+				if (entry->fowner != lnum)
+					result = -EINVAL;
+				else
+					entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
+			}
+			break;
 		case Opt_obj_user:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
@@ -442,7 +515,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 }
 
 /**
- * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules
+ * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
  * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
  *
  * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
@@ -452,12 +525,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 {
 	const char *op = "update_policy";
 	char *p;
-	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	ssize_t result, len;
 	int audit_info = 0;
 
 	/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
-	if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
+	if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 				    NULL, op, "already exists",
 				    -EACCES, audit_info);
@@ -490,9 +563,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 		return result;
 	}
 
-	mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
-	list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
-	mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
+	list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
 
 	return len;
 }
@@ -500,12 +573,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
 void ima_delete_rules(void)
 {
-	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
 
-	mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) {
+	mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
 		list_del(&entry->list);
 		kfree(entry);
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
 }