From 4906e50b37e6f6c264e7ee4237343eb2b7f8d16d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2011 22:00:56 +0400
Subject: [PATCH] CIFS: Fix memory over bound bug in cifs_parse_mount_options
While password processing we can get out of options array bound if
the next character after array is delimiter. The patch adds a check
if we reach the end.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
---
fs/cifs/connect.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index db9d55b507d0a..4bc862a80efa5 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -807,8 +807,7 @@ static int
cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname,
struct smb_vol *vol)
{
- char *value;
- char *data;
+ char *value, *data, *end;
unsigned int temp_len, i, j;
char separator[2];
short int override_uid = -1;
@@ -851,6 +850,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname,
if (!options)
return 1;
+ end = options + strlen(options);
if (strncmp(options, "sep=", 4) == 0) {
if (options[4] != 0) {
separator[0] = options[4];
@@ -916,6 +916,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname,
the only illegal character in a password is null */
if ((value[temp_len] == 0) &&
+ (value + temp_len < end) &&
(value[temp_len+1] == separator[0])) {
/* reinsert comma */
value[temp_len] = separator[0];
--
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