From 6b754d7bd007c5f68fbb2d9abd5c00d253b033d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2023 18:28:42 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] sysctl: expose all net/core sysctls inside netns
All were not visible to the non-priv users inside netns. However,
with 4ecb90090c84 ("sysctl: allow override of /proc/sys/net with
CAP_NET_ADMIN"), these vars are protected from getting modified.
A proc with capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) can change the values so
not having them visible inside netns is just causing nuisance to
process that check certain values (e.g. net.core.somaxconn) and
see different behavior in root-netns vs. other-netns
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
index 5b1ce656baa1d..e7b98162c6321 100644
--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
@@ -643,11 +643,6 @@ static __net_init int sysctl_core_net_init(struct net *net)
for (tmp = tbl; tmp->procname; tmp++)
tmp->data += (char *)net - (char *)&init_net;
-
- /* Don't export any sysctls to unprivileged users */
- if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
- tbl[0].procname = NULL;
- }
}
net->core.sysctl_hdr = register_net_sysctl(net, "net/core", tbl);
--
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