diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
index a4aadd2dc153ea1236fb7fba817b907ec9049ddb..deace5fb4e628beccac22d6df991761d35646584 100644
--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -10,53 +10,16 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
-#include <linux/siphash.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
-u32 prandom_u32(void);
-void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
-void prandom_reseed_late(void);
-
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
-
-#define PRANDOM_ADD_NOISE(a, b, c, d) \
- prandom_u32_add_noise((unsigned long)(a), (unsigned long)(b), \
- (unsigned long)(c), (unsigned long)(d))
-
-#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
-/*
- * The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
- * parallel given enough CPU resources.
- */
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
-
-#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2)
-#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3)
-
-#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
-/*
- * On 32-bit machines, we use HSipHash, a reduced-width version of SipHash.
- * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
- * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
- */
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
-#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2)
-#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3)
-
-#else
-#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
-#endif
+static inline u32 prandom_u32(void)
+{
+ return get_random_u32();
+}
-static inline void prandom_u32_add_noise(unsigned long a, unsigned long b,
- unsigned long c, unsigned long d)
+static inline void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
- /*
- * This is not used cryptographically; it's just
- * a convenient 4-word hash function. (3 xor, 2 add, 2 rol)
- */
- a ^= raw_cpu_read(net_rand_noise);
- PRND_SIPROUND(a, b, c, d);
- raw_cpu_write(net_rand_noise, d);
+ return get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
}
struct rnd_state {
@@ -108,7 +71,6 @@ static inline void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed)
state->s2 = __seed(i, 8U);
state->s3 = __seed(i, 16U);
state->s4 = __seed(i, 128U);
- PRANDOM_ADD_NOISE(state, i, 0, 0);
}
/* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index 9dd2a39cb3b0058e4756ea129cd968195010c00e..c12fe329c9ff335f8846b14fb9ae1e8d6f8f461e 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -1780,8 +1780,6 @@ void update_process_times(int user_tick)
{
struct task_struct *p = current;
- PRANDOM_ADD_NOISE(jiffies, user_tick, p, 0);
-
/* Note: this timer irq context must be accounted for as well. */
account_process_tick(p, user_tick);
run_local_timers();
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index 976632003ec6589f926e804ed2fba1e8b48c1a4c..d5d9029362cbb3e6d44e98c41ce16c4f01360429 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -245,25 +245,13 @@ static struct prandom_test2 {
{ 407983964U, 921U, 728767059U },
};
-static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
-{
- unsigned int val = 0;
-
- (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
- arch_get_random_int(&val));
-
- return val;
-}
-
-static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
- bool mix_with_hwseed)
+static void prandom_state_selftest_seed(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed)
{
#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
-#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
- state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
- state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
- state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
- state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
+ state->s1 = __seed(LCG(seed), 2U);
+ state->s2 = __seed(LCG(state->s1), 8U);
+ state->s3 = __seed(LCG(state->s2), 16U);
+ state->s4 = __seed(LCG(state->s3), 128U);
}
static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
@@ -274,7 +262,7 @@ static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test1); i++) {
struct rnd_state state;
- prandom_seed_early(&state, test1[i].seed, false);
+ prandom_state_selftest_seed(&state, test1[i].seed);
prandom_warmup(&state);
if (test1[i].result != prandom_u32_state(&state))
@@ -289,7 +277,7 @@ static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test2); i++) {
struct rnd_state state;
- prandom_seed_early(&state, test2[i].seed, false);
+ prandom_state_selftest_seed(&state, test2[i].seed);
prandom_warmup(&state);
for (j = 0; j < test2[i].iteration - 1; j++)
@@ -310,324 +298,3 @@ static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
}
core_initcall(prandom_state_selftest);
#endif
-
-/*
- * The prandom_u32() implementation is now completely separate from the
- * prandom_state() functions, which are retained (for now) for compatibility.
- *
- * Because of (ab)use in the networking code for choosing random TCP/UDP port
- * numbers, which open DoS possibilities if guessable, we want something
- * stronger than a standard PRNG. But the performance requirements of
- * the network code do not allow robust crypto for this application.
- *
- * So this is a homebrew Junior Spaceman implementation, based on the
- * lowest-latency trustworthy crypto primitive available, SipHash.
- * (The authors of SipHash have not been consulted about this abuse of
- * their work.)
- *
- * Standard SipHash-2-4 uses 2n+4 rounds to hash n words of input to
- * one word of output. This abbreviated version uses 2 rounds per word
- * of output.
- */
-
-struct siprand_state {
- unsigned long v0;
- unsigned long v1;
- unsigned long v2;
- unsigned long v3;
-};
-
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct siprand_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
-EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(net_rand_noise);
-
-/*
- * This is the core CPRNG function. As "pseudorandom", this is not used
- * for truly valuable things, just intended to be a PITA to guess.
- * For maximum speed, we do just two SipHash rounds per word. This is
- * the same rate as 4 rounds per 64 bits that SipHash normally uses,
- * so hopefully it's reasonably secure.
- *
- * There are two changes from the official SipHash finalization:
- * - We omit some constants XORed with v2 in the SipHash spec as irrelevant;
- * they are there only to make the output rounds distinct from the input
- * rounds, and this application has no input rounds.
- * - Rather than returning v0^v1^v2^v3, return v1+v3.
- * If you look at the SipHash round, the last operation on v3 is
- * "v3 ^= v0", so "v0 ^ v3" just undoes that, a waste of time.
- * Likewise "v1 ^= v2". (The rotate of v2 makes a difference, but
- * it still cancels out half of the bits in v2 for no benefit.)
- * Second, since the last combining operation was xor, continue the
- * pattern of alternating xor/add for a tiny bit of extra non-linearity.
- */
-static inline u32 siprand_u32(struct siprand_state *s)
-{
- unsigned long v0 = s->v0, v1 = s->v1, v2 = s->v2, v3 = s->v3;
- unsigned long n = raw_cpu_read(net_rand_noise);
-
- v3 ^= n;
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- v0 ^= n;
- s->v0 = v0; s->v1 = v1; s->v2 = v2; s->v3 = v3;
- return v1 + v3;
-}
-
-
-/**
- * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
- *
- * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
- * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
- * considered safe for cryptographic use.
- */
-u32 prandom_u32(void)
-{
- struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
- u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
-
- put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
- return res;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
-
-/**
- * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
- * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
- * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
- */
-void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
-{
- struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
- u8 *ptr = buf;
-
- while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) {
- put_unaligned(siprand_u32(state), (u32 *)ptr);
- ptr += sizeof(u32);
- bytes -= sizeof(u32);
- }
-
- if (bytes > 0) {
- u32 rem = siprand_u32(state);
-
- do {
- *ptr++ = (u8)rem;
- rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
- } while (--bytes > 0);
- }
- put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
-
-/**
- * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
- * @entropy: entropy value
- *
- * Add some additional seed material to the prandom pool.
- * The "entropy" is actually our IP address (the only caller is
- * the network code), not for unpredictability, but to ensure that
- * different machines are initialized differently.
- */
-void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
-{
- int i;
-
- add_device_randomness(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct siprand_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
- unsigned long v0 = state->v0, v1 = state->v1;
- unsigned long v2 = state->v2, v3 = state->v3;
-
- do {
- v3 ^= entropy;
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- v0 ^= entropy;
- } while (unlikely(!v0 || !v1 || !v2 || !v3));
-
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3);
- }
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
-
-/*
- * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
- * the prandom_u32() engine to be started.
- */
-static int __init prandom_init_early(void)
-{
- int i;
- unsigned long v0, v1, v2, v3;
-
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v0))
- v0 = jiffies;
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v1))
- v1 = random_get_entropy();
- v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
- v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct siprand_state *state;
-
- v3 ^= i;
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- v0 ^= i;
-
- state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
- state->v0 = v0; state->v1 = v1;
- state->v2 = v2; state->v3 = v3;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-core_initcall(prandom_init_early);
-
-
-/* Stronger reseeding when available, and periodically thereafter. */
-static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused);
-
-static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, prandom_reseed);
-
-static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused)
-{
- unsigned long expires;
- int i;
-
- /*
- * Reinitialize each CPU's PRNG with 128 bits of key.
- * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are,
- * well, expected.
- */
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct siprand_state *state;
- unsigned long v0 = get_random_long(), v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
- unsigned long v1 = get_random_long(), v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
-#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
- int j;
-
- /*
- * On 32-bit machines, hash in two extra words to
- * approximate 128-bit key length. Not that the hash
- * has that much security, but this prevents a trivial
- * 64-bit brute force.
- */
- for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
- unsigned long m = get_random_long();
-
- v3 ^= m;
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- v0 ^= m;
- }
-#endif
- /*
- * Probably impossible in practice, but there is a
- * theoretical risk that a race between this reseeding
- * and the target CPU writing its state back could
- * create the all-zero SipHash fixed point.
- *
- * To ensure that never happens, ensure the state
- * we write contains no zero words.
- */
- state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0 ? v0 : -1ul);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1 ? v1 : -1ul);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2 ? v2 : -1ul);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3 ? v3 : -1ul);
- }
-
- /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
- expires = round_jiffies(jiffies + 40 * HZ + prandom_u32_max(40 * HZ));
- mod_timer(&seed_timer, expires);
-}
-
-/*
- * The random ready callback can be called from almost any interrupt.
- * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
- * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
- */
-static int prandom_timer_start(struct notifier_block *nb,
- unsigned long action, void *data)
-{
- mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
- return 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
-/* Principle: True 32-bit random numbers will all have 16 differing bits on
- * average. For each 32-bit number, there are 601M numbers differing by 16
- * bits, and 89% of the numbers differ by at least 12 bits. Note that more
- * than 16 differing bits also implies a correlation with inverted bits. Thus
- * we take 1024 random numbers and compare each of them to the other ones,
- * counting the deviation of correlated bits to 16. Constants report 32,
- * counters 32-log2(TEST_SIZE), and pure randoms, around 6 or lower. With the
- * u32 total, TEST_SIZE may be as large as 4096 samples.
- */
-#define TEST_SIZE 1024
-static int __init prandom32_state_selftest(void)
-{
- unsigned int x, y, bits, samples;
- u32 xor, flip;
- u32 total;
- u32 *data;
-
- data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) * TEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return 0;
-
- for (samples = 0; samples < TEST_SIZE; samples++)
- data[samples] = prandom_u32();
-
- flip = total = 0;
- for (x = 0; x < samples; x++) {
- for (y = 0; y < samples; y++) {
- if (x == y)
- continue;
- xor = data[x] ^ data[y];
- flip |= xor;
- bits = hweight32(xor);
- total += (bits - 16) * (bits - 16);
- }
- }
-
- /* We'll return the average deviation as 2*sqrt(corr/samples), which
- * is also sqrt(4*corr/samples) which provides a better resolution.
- */
- bits = int_sqrt(total / (samples * (samples - 1)) * 4);
- if (bits > 6)
- pr_warn("prandom32: self test failed (at least %u bits"
- " correlated, fixed_mask=%#x fixed_value=%#x\n",
- bits, ~flip, data[0] & ~flip);
- else
- pr_info("prandom32: self test passed (less than %u bits"
- " correlated)\n",
- bits+1);
- kfree(data);
- return 0;
-}
-core_initcall(prandom32_state_selftest);
-#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST */
-
-/*
- * Start periodic full reseeding as soon as strong
- * random numbers are available.
- */
-static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
-{
- static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
- .notifier_call = prandom_timer_start
- };
- int ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
-
- if (ret == -EALREADY) {
- prandom_timer_start(&random_ready, 0, NULL);
- ret = 0;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-late_initcall(prandom_init_late);
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index 1461c2d9dec8099a9a2d43a704b4c6cb0375f480..19c9beb1136bd155d9e6e8296ed13e16274466b6 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -3527,7 +3527,6 @@ static int xmit_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
dev_queue_xmit_nit(skb, dev);
len = skb->len;
- PRANDOM_ADD_NOISE(skb, dev, txq, len + jiffies);
trace_net_dev_start_xmit(skb, dev);
rc = netdev_start_xmit(skb, dev, txq, more);
trace_net_dev_xmit(skb, rc, dev, len);
@@ -4168,7 +4167,6 @@ static int __dev_queue_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *sb_dev)
if (!skb)
goto out;
- PRANDOM_ADD_NOISE(skb, dev, txq, jiffies);
HARD_TX_LOCK(dev, txq, cpu);
if (!netif_xmit_stopped(txq)) {
@@ -4234,7 +4232,6 @@ int __dev_direct_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 queue_id)
skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, queue_id);
txq = skb_get_tx_queue(dev, skb);
- PRANDOM_ADD_NOISE(skb, dev, txq, jiffies);
local_bh_disable();
diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
index 53a6b14dc50a5bd6a2d940b4ed20943826c71b2b..3d6d33ac20cc29b56a1d8ce4d8930c238025f290 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -536,10 +536,8 @@ static int __inet_insert_ifa(struct in_ifaddr *ifa, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
return ret;
}
- if (!(ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY)) {
- prandom_seed((__force u32) ifa->ifa_local);
+ if (!(ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY))
ifap = last_primary;
- }
rcu_assign_pointer(ifa->ifa_next, *ifap);
rcu_assign_pointer(*ifap, ifa);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index b2250417658850da3516855f6350c66f2a3230db..e7c68fa12fae0343730113f7d718b336ce6c8819 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -3972,8 +3972,6 @@ static void addrconf_dad_begin(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
addrconf_join_solict(dev, &ifp->addr);
- prandom_seed((__force u32) ifp->addr.s6_addr32[3]);
-
read_lock_bh(&idev->lock);
spin_lock(&ifp->lock);
if (ifp->state == INET6_IFADDR_STATE_DEAD)